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Abstract 
Under the traditional franchise value paradigm, competition in banking markets is considered to be 
risk enhancing because of its tendency to raise interest rates on deposits. Taking a contrarian view, 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) have argued that competition in the loan market can lead to lower 
interest rates and hence, reduce bank risk taking. Following these theoretical results, the empirical 
evidence on the relationship between risk and competition in banking has also been mixed. This 
paper analyzes the competition-stability relationship for the Indian banking sector for the period 
1999-2000 to 2012-2013. Banking competition is measured using structural measures of 
concentration viz. 5-bank concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as well as a non-
structural measure of competition- the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic. Our results show that while 
concentration leads to lower levels of default, market and asset risks, it exacerbates the levels of 
capital and liquidity risks. These results have interesting implications for banking sector policy in 
emerging economies. 
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1. Introduction 
The health of the financial sector aids in good economic performance and therefore, it is important 
that the banking sector of a country operates on sound lines. In recent years, the debate regarding 
the effects of competition on risk taking behavior of banks has gained momentum and become an 
area of increased interest for both academicians and policy makers. Two hypotheses are 
predominant in the literature with respect to the above relationship (Schaeck et al, 2006; Berger et 
al, 2008). The “competition-fragility” view states that increased competition among banks lowers 
market power and profit margins, thereby increasing their risk taking. On the other hand, the 
“competition-stability” view suggests that more market power in the market for loans results in 
increased bank risk because higher interest rates on loans make repayment more difficult for the 
borrowers. However, the overall risk of banks may not increase if they protect themselves through 
higher capital or employ other risk-mitigating strategies (Berger et al, 2008). 
 
These arguments indicate that so far no consensus has been reached in the literature on the 
competition- bank risk taking nexus. Further, most of the studies analyzing this relationship, whether 
single or cross-country, have focused mainly on advanced economies. Research on emerging market 
economies (EMEs) is extremely sparse. This is despite the fact that recent global events demonstrate 
a key challenge facing banking regulators in EMEs today is maintaining the stability of their domestic 
banking systems in the face of increased competition from domestic as well as foreign banks. In 
EMEs, a rapidly developing financial system can pose systemic risks if policymakers underestimate 
its wider ramifications.  
 
In order to fill this gap in the literature this paper analyzes the competition-risk taking relationship 
by considering the Indian banking sector as a case study. India is one of the most important EMEs 
with a GDP growth rate that has recently surpassed China’s. India’s banking sector is quite well 
developed and is characterized by a vast spectrum of banks of different sizes and ownership 
categories. Since the liberalization of the economy in 1990s with new banks entering the market, 
increasing competition has often raised concerns about its implications for stability. There are similar 
concerns in policy circles across EMEs. Our study contributes both specifically to the existing 
literature on EMEs as well as in general to the existing knowledge on the competition and risk taking 
behavior of banks.  
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This is the first paper to examine the impact of competition on the various risks (i.e., default, 
market, asset, capital and liquidity risks) faced by Indian scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). 
Following Anzoategui et al (2010), we consider a non-structural measure of competition viz. 
Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-Statistic and following Liu et al (2010), several structural measures of 
market power viz. 5-bank concentration ratios (based on loans, deposits and assets) and the 
Hirfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). We also take into account the effects of other bank specific 
and macroeconomic controls such as return on assets (ROA), size and the annual GDP growth rate. 
The risk and concentration/ competition measures along with control variables are explained in 
greater detail in Section 3. The study spans the period 1999-2000 to 2012-2013 and uses an 
unbalanced panel data set consisting of 756 observations. Our results show that increased 
competition leads to higher stability when related to default, market and asset risks. However, 
competition adversely affects capital and liquidity risks, thus lowering stability. This mixed evidence 
has interesting policy implications as discussed in the concluding section. 
 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
competition-stability nexus. Section 3 highlights the data sources and methodology applied in the 
paper. Section 4 provides the analysis of descriptive statistics and broad trends while section 5 
highlights the estimation results from panel data regressions. Section 6 concludes and provides policy 
implications of our findings.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In the past couple of decades, an extant theoretical and empirical literature has come up, 
investigating the issue of competition and stability in banking. This has occurred due to questions 
regarding what type of market structure leads to a productive and sound environment for banks to 
function in (Liu et al, 2010). 
 
The traditional competition-fragility view provides models which conclude that higher 
concentration and lower competition in banking systems lead to greater stability as higher profits 
act as a cushion against fragility. The need to protect their franchise value provides banks with 
incentives against excessive risk taking. In more competitive environments, there is greater 
pressure on maintaining profits, which makes banks take on more risks, resulting in higher 
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fragility. On the other hand, in systems where entry is restricted, there is limited competition. Thus, 
banks have better profit opportunities, capital cushions and therefore fewer incentives to take on 
excessive risks, thus affecting financial stability positively (Beck, 2008)  
In contrast to the above, the competition-fragility argument asserts that greater concentration in 
banking structures results in more risk taking by banks (Beck, 2008). Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) 
argue that viewpoint of market power boosting profits and hence banking stability ignores the 
potential impact of banks’ market power on firm behavior. Instead of banks choosing the riskiness 
of their assets, borrowers end up having to choose the riskiness of their investment, undertaken in 
the form of bank loans. The authors argue that concentrated banking systems enhance market 
power, which then allows banks to increase the interest rate they charge to firms. These higher 
interest rates may induce firms to assume greater risk, which results in a higher probability of loans 
turning bad/ non-performing.1  
Arping (2014) presents a model in which competition makes banks more reluctant to take on 
excessive risks. The author shows that as competition intensifies and margins decline, banks face 
greater threats of failure. They respond to such contingencies by reducing their risk-taking. Yet, at 
the same time, banks become riskier. This is attributed to the fact that the direct, destabilizing 
effect of lower margins outweighs the disciplining effect of competition. Moreover, an increase in 
competition reduces banks' incentive to build precautionary capital buffers. The vital implication 
following this is that the effects of competition on risk-taking and on failure risk can move in 
opposite directions. 
 
The empirical literature contains several cross-country studies on the competition-risk 
relationship. Beck et al (2005) empirically examined the relationship between concentration and 
banking system fragility using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a 
panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for 1993-2004. They found 
that a banking system that is highly concentrated also has larger and more diversified banks which 
help to generate stability. Their results also suggest that concentration is associated with lower 
probability of a country facing a systemic banking crisis.  
                                                          
1 Saha and Sensarma (2013) showed that the results of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) are conditional upon credit risk 
not exceeding a critical level. 
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Schaeck et al (2006) examined the relationship between competition and banking system fragility 
employing data from 38 countries during the period 1980 – 2003. Using the Panzar and Rosse H-
Statistic as a measure for competition, their results suggest that banking systems that are more 
competitive are less vulnerable to systemic crises. They conclude that competition and 
concentration are significantly different from each other and describe different characteristics of 
banking systems. Whereas concentration is definitely a measure of market structure, they argue 
that competition can be said to measure competitive dynamics among financial institutions. 
 
Berger et al (2008) focus on the impact of market power on measures of loan risk, bank risk, and 
bank equity. Based on data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed economies, their results show that 
banks with a greater degree of market power have less overall risk exposure. While this result 
appears consistent with the “competition-fragility” view, their work also finds that market power 
increases loan portfolio risk which is in line with the “competition-stability” view. Beck et al 
(2011) show that not only is the relationship between bank competition and stability ambiguous, 
but it can also differ across countries depending on market, regulatory and institutional features. 
They show that higher competition will have a larger impact on banks’ risk taking incentives in 
those systems that have stricter activity restrictions, more homogenous market structures, more 
generous deposit insurance schemes and better credit information sharing. Liu et al (2013) studied 
the relationship between competition and bank stability in 11 European countries over the period 
2000-2008. They find evidence for a U-shaped relationship between competition and stability. In 
other words there is an optimum level of bank competition that would keep bank risks at a 
minimum level. 
 
While the above studies are based on data taken mostly from developed countries, there are a few 
studies pertaining specifically to EMEs. Crystal et al (2002) studied banks in select Latin American 
countries during the period 1995-2000 and found that foreign banks show more robust loan growth, 
a more aggressive response to asset quality deterioration and a greater ability to absorb losses than 
domestic banks. They conclude that such characteristics can help strengthen the financial systems 
of host countries. Yeyati and Micco (2003) study bank competition and foreign entry in eight Latin 
American countries and the implications for risk taking. Their results show that foreign bank entry 
leads to less competition in banking. They also find that banking sector fragility is positively 
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related to competition and therefore foreign bank entry can lead to banking stability despite foreign 
banks in the region having higher insolvency risk and more volatile returns.  
 
Zhang et al (2013) study the relationship between bank performance measured by technical 
efficiency, risk and competition across BRIC economies, using 1001 bank-year observations 
covering major domestic commercial banks for the period 2003-10. They find that efficient banks 
take a lower level of risks and that the presence of state ownership and foreign banks reduces bank 
efficiency. Amidu and Wolfe (2013) study the effects of competition on diversification and 
stability using a sample of 978 banks in 55 developing economies from 2000–2007. Their main 
finding indicates that competition increases stability as diversification across and within both 
interest and non-interest income generating activities of banks increases. They identify revenue 
diversification as a channel through which competition reduces bank insolvency risk. Soedarmono 
and Tarazi (2014) study a sample of commercial banks in Asia Pacific from 1994-2009 and 
highlight the fact that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher 
instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting that 
Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank market 
structure. The study advocates greater reliance on market discipline and strengthening of financial 
intermediation to promote bank stability. 
 
Some studies have examined the relationship between competition and stability using different 
kinds of market segmentation within the banking sector of individual countries as the basis for 
their investigation. Ghosh (2009) explores the liaison between charter value and bank risk‐taking 
for India for the period 1996-2006. He also studies the determinants of charter value, particularly 
focusing on competition. The results indicate that concentration in deposits or loans markets exerts 
a strong influence on charter value of banks. Thus, there is a strong link between competition and 
charter value. Further, banks’ size, their operating efficiency and non-interest income are the main 
determinants of charter value. Zhao et al (2009) study the lending market of Indian banks through 
which they attempt to understand the effect of financial reforms on competition and risk taking 
incentives of banks during 1992-2004. They observe that there is an increase in competition due 
to reforms which also increased banks’ risk taking.  
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Goetz (2012) examines the effect of a bank’s diversification on its risk taking behavior as well as 
the risk taking behavior of competing, non- diversified banks in the US. The results reveal that 
greater geographic diversification of banks affects a bank’s lending behavior and market interest 
rates. This has further ramifications for non-diversified competitors due to interactions in the 
banking market. By utilizing the state-specific timing of a removal of intrastate branching 
restrictions, the study indicates that a bank’s diversification also impacts the risk taking of 
competitors, even if these banks are not diversifying their activities. 
 
Liu and Wilson (2013) examine how the relationship between competition and risk varies across 
different ownership structures for the Japanese banking system over the period 2000—2009. They 
find that, on a national basis, City and Trust banks take on more risk on average than their 
regionally focused counterparts, i.e. Regional, Tier 2 Regional, Shinkin and Credit Cooperative 
banks. The relationship between competition and risk also differs across bank types on the basis 
of different initial levels of risk. Increasing competition seems to reduce the risk of City banks and 
increase the risk of the other types of banks.  
 
Jimenez et al (2013) investigates the linearity of the relationship between bank competition and 
risk. The paper uses data for 107 commercial and savings banks in Spain for the period 1988-2003. 
Their empirical results suggest a nonlinear relationship between banking market competition and 
bank risk-taking using standard concentration measures for both loan and deposit markets. 
However when the Lerner index is used as a measure of bank competition, the result does not 
indicate a nonlinear relationship. Kick and Prieto (2013) analyze the competition-bank risk nexus 
by using bank-level data for German cooperative and savings banks for the period 1994-2010. 
Using bank specific, efficiency- adjusted Lerner Index as a proxy for bank-specific market power, 
they conclude that market power tends to reduce risks. In contrast, using the Boone Indicator (the 
elasticity of profits to marginal costs) and/or the regional branch share as a measure of competition, 
the results suggest that higher competition leads to lower risks. 
Relating competition and concentration to some specific types of risks, Agoraki et al (2009) 
investigate whether the effects of regulation on banking risks are actually caused by the market 
powers of banks. Using data for the Central and European banking sectors from 1998-2005 they 
8 
 
find suggest that higher market power is associated with lower credit risk and lower probability of 
default of banks. Choudhury et al (2010) study the relationship between bank ownership 
concentration and risks measured by non-performing loans and capital adequacy ratio for around 
500 commercial banks for more than 50 countries over the period 2005-2007. The results show 
that concentrated ownership significantly reduces a bank’s bad loans ratio and increases capital 
ratio. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership 
concentration can lead to reduction in banks’ riskiness. Schaeck and Cihak (2012) study the effect 
of competition on capital buffers held by banks. Based on an analysis of data for more than 2,600 
banks from 10 European countries during 1999–2004, the authors find that the Panzar-Rosse H-
Statistic has a positive and significant effect on capital ratios indicating that banks hold more 
capital when faced with higher competition. 
There is no existing empirical research that focuses on analyzing the link between competition and 
risk taking behavior of banks in India, although studies for developed economies such as Europe, 
Germany, Japan and the United States and some emerging market economies do exist. The two 
studies which come closest to our paper and that also study Indian banking are Ghosh (2009) and 
Zhao et al (2009). While Ghosh (2009) focuses on charter value and risk taking but not 
competition, Zhao et al (2009) investigate the impact of reforms on competition and risk taking in 
the lending market. However, our study stands out in that we focus specifically on the impact of 
competition, measured by both the structural and non-structural approaches, on a variety of risks 
faced by banks.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, our paper makes several contributions. This is the first study 
that attempts to relate competition with risk in the case of Indian banks. Second, we measure 
concentration/ competition in a number of ways viz. structural measures like the 5-bank 
concentration ratios (based on loans, deposits and assets) and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI) along with the non-structural Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic. Third we study bank stability 
using a variety of risk indicators such as default, market, asset, capital and liquidity risks. Our 
empirical results provide a comprehensive understanding of the competition-stability link for 
Indian SCBs and thereby contribute to the relevant literature.  
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3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Bank-wise figures of the relevant variables employed in the study for Indian SCBs, i.e., public 
sector banks, Indian private banks and foreign banks, have been gathered from the various issues 
of Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India. It is an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) which provides audited data on the balance sheet and income statements of individual 
banks. Our data-set covers the period 1999-2000 to 2012-2013. Macroeconomic data has been 
collected from the RBI’s Handbook of Statistics for the Indian Economy.  
 
To assess the impact of competition on banks’ risk, we estimate equation (1) as follows: 
Riskit = αi + β1cit + β2xit + εit …………………. Eqn. (1) 
 
where Risk = a risk indicator; αi represents bank specific effects; c = vector of concentration/ 
competition variables; x = vector of bank specific and macroeconomic controls. While the above 
specification has contemporaneous variables on the right hand side, we tried estimating with 
lagged independent variables. The results remain qualitatively unchanged indicating that our 
results do not suffer from endogeneity problems. Following Altunbas et al (2007) and Zhang et al 
(2013), we define five different measures of risk viz. default risk, asset risk, market risk, capital 
risk and liquidity risk. The last two are measured by capital and liquidity buffers of banks which 
imply protection against risks and hence are closer to soundness in their interpretation. For 
concentration/ competition variables we use three types of concentration ratios (5-bank 
concentration ratio or CR5 based on assets, deposits and loans), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic. The control variables are bank size, profitability and GDP 
growth. Table 1 provides the definition and computation for each risk, concentration/ competition 
and control variable used in the study. While the risk and control variables are computed using 
simple formulas described in Table 1, the estimation procedures for the concentration/ competition 
variables require some explanation. 
 
Following Liu et al (2010), we calculate the 5-bank concentration ratios (CR) and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as follows: 
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CRn = Σsi ………………………………….. Eqn. (2) 
where si is the share of the i’th largest banks in total loans, deposits or assets. In other words, si = 
xi/Σxi , where xi is the market share of bank i and n is the number of banks in the market. We 
calculate CR5 based on assets, deposits and loans. However we note that Indian banking is 
characterized by different types of banks across ownership and size categories. Banks compete 
with their counterparts within the same market segment and therefore it is more appropriate to 
infer competitive conditions within a peer group. To allow this, we take n in equation (2) as the 
number of banks in the relevant market segment where a bank operates. To define market segments 
we divide the banking market into the following groups: small domestic banks, large domestic 
banks and foreign banks. Foreign banks in India operate as branches of foreign headquartered 
banks and are not locally incorporated. They cater to multinational companies or those with forex 
requirements and high net worth individuals (e.g. business travelers). We divide domestic banks 
into small and large groups on the basis of the median value of their total assets. Banks above the 
medium value are classified as large while banks below it as classified as small. We assume that 
domestic banks compete with peers which are at par with them in terms of size. There is enough 
anecdotal evidence from Indian banking sector to support this approach. Large banks such as State 
Bank of India (a state owned bank) and ICICI Bank (a relatively new private sector bank) fiercely 
compete among each other at a pan-India level and with other large banks. At the other end of the 
size scale there are smaller banks such as Vijaya Bank (a state owned bank) and Federal Bank (an 
old private sector bank) who target similar customers and business. 
 
The HHI is defined as follows: 
 
HHI = Σsi2 …………………. Eqn. (3) 
 
In case of a monopoly, HHI = 1. In case of an industry with n banks, the maximum possible value 
of the HHI would be 1 and the minimum possible value would be 1/n.  
 
Following Anzoategui et al (2010), we estimate equation (2) to obtain the Panzar-Rosse H-
Statistic: 
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ln(TIit)= α + β1 ln(W1it) + β2 ln(W2it) + β3 ln(W3it) + γ ln(Zit) + εit ……….. Eqn. (4)      
 
where: 
 
TI= total income /total assets (proxy for banks’ output price) 
W1 = interest expenses /total deposits + total borrowings (proxy for input price of deposits)  
W2 = personnel expenses /total assets (proxy for input price of labor)  
W3 = other operating and administrative expenses /total assets (proxy for input price of 
equipment/fixed capital)  
 
In equation (4), Z is a matrix of controls which includes equity /total assets, gross advances /total 
assets and size (logarithm of total assets). The equation is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method. The error term ε is assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
The H-Statistic (H-stat henceforth) is defined as β1+β2+β3, the sum of the input price elasticities 
of total revenues. The H-stat essentially measures the responsiveness of bank revenues to changes 
in input prices. An H-stat ≤ 0 is a sign of a monopoly; H-stat = 1 represents perfect competition, 
and an H-stat value that lies between 0 and 1 indicates monopolistic competition. The estimation 
of H-stat is done for the separate peer groups, viz. small domestic banks, large domestic banks and 
foreign banks. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the mean values of the relevant variables while Figures 1 and 2 show the trend in 
risk and competition indicators over the sample period 2000-2013 for all scheduled commercial 
banks taken together. Mean values are calculated using weighted average where relative asset 
share is taken as weight. The results shows that mean weighted capital risk and mean weighted 
asset risk have remained fairly consistent for the entire sample period. Mean weighted market risk 
and mean weighted liquidity risk demonstrate a pattern of consistent increase and decrease 
respectively from the beginning till the end of the period. Mean weighted default risk declines 
drastically during 2008-2009, which is the peak financial crisis period, showing that the Indian 
banking sector was probably able to cushion the credit risk arising from bad loans in their overall 
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portfolio. However, from 2011-2013, there has been a sharp increase in default risk, suggesting 
that the proportion of bad loans has increased considerably. With respect to the competition 
variables, the mean CR5 (assets), mean CR5 (deposits), mean CR5 (loans) and mean HHI have 
remained considerably stable for the whole sample period. However, the mean H-stat, which is an 
indicator of banks’ reaction to changes in input prices, has shown wide fluctuations. It displays a 
pattern of sharp rises and falls. The periods of sharp increase indicate a rise in banking market 
competition while lower values indicate a fall in the degree of competition. 
 
Table 3 provides the broad descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of the variables 
mentioned in Table 1 across four categorizations- all banks, large domestic banks, small domestic 
banks and foreign banks. In terms of the risk indicators, foreign banks tend to exhibit higher values 
of mean and standard deviation as compared to the other categories. For the concentration 
variables, the statistics indicate that, foreign banks tend to have a higher mean except for H-Stat 
which measures competition. However, the standard deviation is higher for small domestic banks, 
indicating greater variation. With respect to control variables, foreign banks exhibit a higher mean 
value of ROA, while small and large domestic banks and all SCBs together, exhibit a higher mean 
value of size. The mean and standard deviation of annual GDP growth rate are the same for all 
categories as it is a bank-invariant variable. 
 
Table 4 shows results from tests of differences in means of the relevant variables using the t test 
(two tailed, unequal variances). With respect to the first categorization for comparison, i.e. small 
domestic banks vs. large domestic banks, we find that for risk indicators, the difference between 
means is significant for market risk and asset risk. Differences between the two bank groups for 
all the competition variables are significant, while among the control variables, only size difference 
is significant, indicating greater variation. For the second categorization, i.e. foreign banks vs. 
small domestic banks, the table shows that all the competition, risk and control variables are 
significant with respect to differences in their means. For the third comparison category, i.e. 
foreign banks vs. large domestic banks, the results are the same as for category two. 
Table 5 demonstrates the degree of correlation amongst the dependent and explanatory variables 
used in the multiple regression analysis. The main highlights of the table are as follows. Firstly, 
size is negatively correlated with all the risk variables. This means that as banks grow larger, they 
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are more prone to risks. Size is also negatively correlated with all the competition indicators, 
suggesting that the larger the bank, the lesser the chances of it facing intense competition from 
banks which are not at par. Similarly, negative correlation is observed between size and ROA, 
indicating that big banks can have lower profitability. However, size has a positive correlation 
with the annual GDP growth rate, meaning that a robust economic environment improves the 
performance of large banks. The second prominent variable affecting risk negatively is the annual 
GDP growth rate. It is negatively correlated with all risk indicators, showing that during a low 
economic cycle, banks are subject to higher risk. Amongst the competition indicators, excepting 
H-stat, GDP growth has a positive correlation with all the other variables. This indicates that a 
good business environment provides banks with the incentive to perform better, thus increasing 
competition. It displays a negative correlation with ROA, indicating that a not so stable economic 
cycle leads to lower returns for banks. 
5. Estimation Results 
We now report the results of our main regression as specified in equation (1). We employ panel 
regression methods and the choice between fixed effects and random effects models is driven by 
the outcome of Hausman tests. When the Hausman test favours the fixed effects (FE) model, we 
present the relevant estimates along with the F-test statistic to measure goodness of fit of the model. 
In case of random effects (RE), the F-test is not available and hence we present the Wald test 
statistic to assess the model fit. We begin the discussion with the effect of concentration (measured 
by the 5-bank concentration ratio based on loans and the HHI) on all five types of risk. 
Table 6 reports the empirical estimation results for default risk, market risk and asset risk as the 
dependent variables. We find that in model (1), the CR5 for loans has a positive coefficient of 
0.204 that is statistically significant at the 10% level. This shows that banks with larger market 
shares in the loan market could be more vulnerable to a bad loans problem. This evidence favours 
the insight of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who argued that competition in the loan market can 
actually help because the consequent fall in interest rates would lead to lower credit risks. The 
coefficient of HHI in model (2) is also positive but statistically significant. With respect to the 
control variables, we observe that both size and annual GDP growth have negative and statistically 
significant coefficients, indicating that a large scale of operations and upswings in the business 
cycle cause default risk to decline. Large banks have better risk management expertise which may 
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explain the lower proportion of NPAs in their overall portfolio. Robust GDP growth improves the 
financial health of borrowers and hence leads to less defaults. 
Within table 6, models (3) and (4) present the results for market risk. We find that the concentration 
variable of CR5 (loans) has a positive coefficient of 0.522 which is statistically significant at the 
1% level. Therefore, larger the market share of banks in the loan market, the greater is the market 
risk they are exposed to. This indicates that banks have to access short term debt from other banks 
to keep protecting their market share. However the other measure of concentration viz. HHI does 
not show a significant coefficient. Size is the only control variable with a significant coefficient. 
The negative sign of the coefficient suggests that as banks grow larger, dependence on borrowings 
and exposure to interest rate volatility make them more vulnerable to market risk. Moving to the 
regressions for asset risk in models (5) and (6), we observe that both the CR5 and the HHI variables 
have positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results suggest 
that banks with a higher market share in lending have to hold more loan loss provisions against 
their total assets. As loan loss provisions in Indian banks is computed from a backward looking 
formula based on the quality of existing assets, this is an indication that banks with higher market 
power carry more stressed assets on their balance sheet. Size has a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that big banks tend to keep a greater proportion of loan loss provisions. 
ROA enters the equation positively and significantly, indicating that the more profitable the bank, 
the higher is its asset risk. Overall the above findings provide support for the competition-stability 
view which suggests that concentration can exacerbate risk taking while competition helps to 
reduce risks.  
Table 7 presents results for capital risk and liquidity risk, measured by the protection or buffer that 
banks have from these risks. In models (1) and (2) we observe that CR5 for loans has the coefficient 
12.518 that is significant at the 1% level. The HHI also has a positive coefficient of 26.397 that is 
significant at the 1% level. These results mean that banks in highly concentrated market segments 
hold more capital. In other words, banks with higher market power are safer from an equity risk 
perspective as they hold more capital. While this may be due to higher regulatory capital 
requirements imposed by the banking regulator, it also supports the competition-fragility view that 
banks with higher market power protect themselves with higher capital or other risk management 
measures (Berger et al, 2008). Amongst the control variables, size has a negative and significant 
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relationship with capital risk while ROA displays a positive and significant relationship. This 
suggests that larger banks are more prone to capital risk and banks with higher profits are more 
stable. The annual GDP growth rate has a negative and significant coefficient, implying that during 
an upswing of the business cycle, banks can be more prone to capital risk. Models (3) and (4) in 
table 7 examines how competition variables affect liquidity risk. However neither CR5 nor HHI 
show statistically significant coefficients. With respect to bank specific controls, size enters the 
equation negatively and significantly, suggesting that larger banks can face difficulties in meeting 
their liabilities when they fall due, making them prone to liquidity risk. In the long run, inability 
to keep sufficient amount of liquid assets can lead to financial distress and insolvency. ROA enters 
the equation positively and significantly, suggesting that banks which generate high profits tend 
to have lower liquidity risk. The annual GDP growth rate has a positive and significant coefficient, 
thus indicating that a good business cycle promotes stability. In sum, while concentration does not 
seem to affect liquidity risk, our results for capital risk confirm the findings of Berger et al (2008) 
that concentration encourages banks to protect themselves through higher equity capital. 
 
Table 8 illustrates the relationship between risk taking and competition where the latter is 
measured by the H Stat described earlier. In most of the risk categories, expect market risk, we do 
not find any role of completion. In case of market risk (model 2), we observe a positive coefficient 
for H Stat that is significant at the 10% level. This indicates that greater competition leads to 
increased reliance on inter-bank borrowings thereby increasing the vulnerability to interest rate 
fluctuations. This result contradicts our previous finding with CR5 in table 6 where we concluded 
that concentration leads to higher market risk. This is a puzzle for us but we prefer to go by the 
result for CR5 which had a lower probability of type-I error as the level of significance was 1%. 
 
Finally we carry out some robustness checks for the above results. In tables 9 and 10, we re-
estimate the risk-concentration relationship with two alternative measures of CR5 based on 
deposits and assets. In all cases our previous results get repeated. For instance, the coefficient of 
CR5 based on deposits is positive and significant for default risk, market risk, asset risk and capital 
risk. This confirms that higher concentration exacerbates default risk, market risk and asset risk 
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but also leads to higher equity held by banks. The coefficient of CR5 based on assets is positive 
and significant for market risk, asset risk and capital risk as before. Interestingly, for the first time 
the coefficient of CR5 turns out to be positive and significant for liquidity risk suggesting that as 
banks’ market share grows larger, they are also able to hold more liquid assets to meet their 
liabilities as and when they fall due. This reduces their vulnerability to liquidity risk. This further 
confirms our previous results and the findings of Berger et al (2008) that banks with higher market 
power are able to protect themselves using various risk mitigation strategies. 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
We test the competition- stability liaison for the Indian scheduled commercial banking sector for 
the period 1999-2000 to 20122013. Five types of risk, i.e., default risk, asset risk, market risk, 
capital risk and liquidity risk are analyzed to see how competition affects them. We find that 
concentration affects default risk, asset risk and market risk positively, indicating that increased 
competition can help to reduce some types of risks faced by banks. On the other hand concentration 
has positive relationships with capital and liquidity ratios, suggesting that increase in competition 
may lead to financial instability.  
Our results have important implications for banking sector policy. The evidence from this paper 
suggests that infusing more competition in the banking sector would engender greater financial 
stability which is in line with the competition-stability view in the literature or the theoretical work 
of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). However while encouraging competition, the RBI should be 
cognizant about pressures on capital and liquidity buffers of banks. Therefore, any strategy on 
entry of new banks has to be carefully coordinated with supervisory efforts and macro-prudential 
policy in order to derive the benefits of greater competition in the banking industry. In recent years 
the RBI has been trying to open up the banking sector to new entrants. The regulator is currently 
reviewing applications for setting up new banks. As the RBI is India’s banking regulator as well 
as monetary policy authority, it would do well to calibrate its bank licensing policy with macro-
prudential efforts due to the close relationship between competition and risks evidenced above. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Risk Variables  
Default Risk Default risk is measured by gross NPAs to gross advances. A 
higher NPL ratio indicates a higher proportion of problematic 
loans in a bank’s overall portfolio and increases its exposure 
to credit risk.  
Asset Risk Asset risk is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
total assets. While higher provisions helps to absorb losses in 
a better fashion, making such banks less prone to bankruptcy, 
but in case of India where provisioning is pro-cyclical, the 
ratio is a backward looking indicator of the quality of assets 
on a bank’s books. Therefore a higher ratio would indicate 
inferior asset quality i.e. higher asset risk. 
Market Risk Market risk is measured by the ratio of interbank borrowings 
to total borrowings. A high value of this ratio for a bank 
indicates that it relies more on interbank borrowing and faces 
higher risk arising from movements in interest rates. Interbank 
markets are vital for banks’ liquidity management when 
interbank markets function smoothly in normal time. 
However, in crisis periods, overreliance on interbank 
borrowing can lead to liquidity problems. 
Capital Risk Capital risk is measured by the capital buffer of banks given 
by the ratio of equity to total assets. It reflects to what extent a 
bank’s total assets are funded by equity capital. A bank with a 
lower ratio indicates higher risk and vice versa.  
Liquidity Risk Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank faces of insufficient 
liquidity in order to meet its liabilities as and when they fall 
due. It is measured by the liquidity buffer or the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets. The higher the ratio, the lower is the 
liquidity risk a bank faces.  
Concentration 
Variables 
 
CR5 The n-bank concentration ratio, denoted by CRn, measures the 
share of the industry’s n largest banks with respect to a 
measure of total industry size. The most widely used size 
measures are based on loans, deposits and assets. CRn = Σ si 
where si is the share of the i’th largest banks in total loans, 
deposits or assets of a particular bank segment. Further, si = 
xi/Σ xi , where xi is the market share of bank i in total assets of 
the banking segment. CRn for n = 3, 4, 5 or 8 are among the 
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most widely quoted n-firm concentration ratios. We use CR5 
for assets, deposits and loans. 
HHI The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated as HHI 
= Σ si2 where si is the market share of bank i in the total assets 
of a banking segment. In an industry where there is a single 
monopoly producer, HHI = 1. In an industry with n banks, the 
maximum possible value of the HHI is 1 while its minimum 
possible value is 1/n. 
Competition 
Variable 
 
H-Stat The H-statistic is calculated from a reduced form revenue 
equation in which factor price inputs and bank outputs are 
related. Since this approach observes bank’s reaction to 
changes in input prices, the H-statistic equals the sum of the 
coefficients of input price factors with respect to bank revenue. 
0<H<1 can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of 
competition, with higher the value, higher intensity of 
competition. Under perfect competition, H=1. 
Bank Specific 
Controls 
 
Return on Assets  ROA reflects the ability of a bank’s management to generate 
profits from its assets. It is calculated as ROA= Profit during 
the year/Total Assets. 
 
Size An important part of bank policy making is trying to 
understand which size helps banks in managing risk better. It 
is measured by the log of total assets. 
Macroeconomic 
Control 
 
GDP Growth Rate 
 
High levels of GDP growth occurring during an upswing of 
business cycle might engender good business opportunities for 
banks. It is measured by annual growth rate of real GDP. 
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Table 2: Mean Weighted Risk and Mean Competition Variables 
Year Mean 
Wtd 
Capital 
Risk 
Mean 
Wtd 
Default 
Risk 
Mean 
Wtd 
Market 
Risk 
Mean 
Wtd 
Liquidity 
Risk 
Mean 
Wtd 
Asset 
Risk 
Mean 
CR5a 
Mean 
CR5d 
Mean 
CR5l 
Mean 
HHI 
Mean 
H-
Stat 
2000 0.010 0.136 0.070 0.144 0.004 0.548 0.556 0.568 0.095 0.461 
2001 0.007 0.119 0.101 0.142 0.004 0.544 0.547 0.557 0.094 0.386 
2002 0.008 0.114 0.135 0.140 0.006 0.696 0.630 0.626 0.159 0.881 
2003 0.006 0.088 0.153 0.098 0.009 0.655 0.620 0.630 0.155 0.759 
2004 0.006 0.071 0.153 0.097 0.008 0.621 0.626 0.624 0.120 0.698 
2005 0.007 0.037 0.138 0.068 0.005 0.708 0.698 0.705 0.150 0.359 
2006 0.004 0.031 0.100 0.090 0.006 0.723 0.734 0.720 0.139 0.571 
2007 0.002 0.022 0.106 0.096 0.006 0.683 0.692 0.687 0.127 0.627 
2008 0.003 0.021 0.118 0.099 0.006 0.655 0.657 0.650 0.133 0.547 
2009 0.003 0.023 0.049 0.095 0.009 0.710 0.718 0.716 0.153 0.663 
2010 0.004 0.025 0.068 0.091 0.009 0.686 0.702 0.696 0.136 0.428 
2011 0.004 0.019 0.064 0.091 0.009 0.671 0.681 0.649 0.159 0.555 
2012 0.000 0.114 0.060 0.074 0.007 0.635 0.700 0.632 0.135 0.198 
2013 0.000 0.129 0.047 0.061 0.007 0.644 0.698 0.623 0.138 0.510 
CR5a= assets of the 5 largest banks; CR5d= deposits of the 5 largest banks; CR5l= loans/advances 
of the 5 largest banks 
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Figure 1: Trends in Mean Weighted Risk Variables 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in Competition Variables 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 All Banks 
No. of Obs:751 
Large Domestic 
Banks 
No. of Obs:253 
Small Domestic 
Banks 
No. of Obs:244 
Foreign Banks 
No. of Obs:254 
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Risk Variables 
 
        
Capital Risk 1.243 7.865 0.011 0.022 0.014 0.028 3.673 13.255 
Default Risk 0.113 0.327 0.071 0.075 0.079 0.082 0.187 0.547 
Market Risk 0.280 0.320 0.100 0.159 0.220 0.283 0.518 0.330 
Liquidity Risk 1.168 8.116 0.105 0.059 0.111 0.070 3.264 13.782 
Asset Risk 0.206 1.300 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.007 0.593 2.196 
         
Competition 
Variables 
        
CR5 Assets 0.643 0.160 0.585 0.041 0.502 0.088 0.838 0.075 
CR5 Deposits 0.646 0.156 0.572 0.040 0.526 0.106 0.834 0.070 
CR5 
Loans/Advances 
0.637 0.143 0.589 0.040 0.507 0.083 0.809 0.063 
HHI 0.131 0.057 0.119 0.012 0.079 0.018 0.194 0.049 
H Stat 0.549 0.249 0.643 0.217 0.462 0.241 0.541 0.255 
         
Control 
Variables 
        
ROA 0.135 1.222 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.384 2.082 
Size 5.995 1.107 6.881 0.400 6.020 0.588 5.089 1.206 
GDP Growth 6.937 2.022 6.993 2.021 6.994 2.023 6.828 2.027 
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Table 4: Test of Means (t statistics) 
Comparison 
Categories 
Small Domestic 
Banks vs. Large 
Domestic Banks 
Foreign Banks vs. 
Small Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign Banks vs. 
Large Domestic 
Banks 
t statistics    
Risk Variables    
Capital Risk 1.115 4.400*** 4.403*** 
Default Risk 1.075 3.115*** 3.340*** 
Market Risk 5.761*** 10.847*** 18.177*** 
Liquidity Risk 1.154 3.645*** 3.653*** 
Asset Risk 1.997** 4.218*** 4.226*** 
    
Competition 
Variables 
   
CR5 Assets -13.461*** 45.688*** 46.981*** 
CR5 Deposits -6.312*** 38.288*** 52.134*** 
CR5 Loans/Advances -13.860*** 45.407*** 46.891*** 
HHI -28.639*** 34.898*** 23.519*** 
H Stat -8.801*** 3.562*** -4.845*** 
    
Control Variables    
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
-0.247 2.878*** 2.877*** 
Size -17.706*** -11.011*** -21.924*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Correlation Statistics 
Variables Capr Dr Mr Lr Ar Cr5a Cr5d Cr5l HHI H-Stat ROA Size GDPG 
Capr 1             
Dr 0.173 1            
Mr 0.246 0.175 1           
Lr 0.641 0.088 0.227 1          
Ar 0.873 0.140 0.218 0.591 1         
Cr5a 0.252 0.095 0.451 0.208 0.242 1        
Cr5d 0.156 0.068 0.403 0.113 0.145 0.954 1       
Cr5l 0.180 0.080 0.405 0.128 0.167 0.976 0.970 1      
HHI 0.315 0.095 0.400 0.248 0.301 0.938 0.858 0.874 1     
H-Stat 0.156 0.002 0.078 0.154 0.159 0.118 -0.059 0.035 0.238 1    
ROA 0.724 0.061 0.171 0.619 0.800 0.170 0.103 0.120 0.214 0.109 1   
Size -0.512 -0.293 -0.574 -0.411 -0.485 -0.386 -0.299 -0.312 -0.368 -0.065 -0.350 1  
GDPG -0.181 -0.172 -0.115 -0.128 -0.171 0.117 0.170 0.180 0.005 -0.052 -0.125 0.244 1 
Note: Capr = Capital risk; Dr = Default risk; Mr= Market risk; Lr= Liquidity risk; Ar = Asset risk 
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Table 6: Concentration and Risk (Default Risk, Market Risk, Asset Risk) 
 Default Risk 
(Gross NPAs/ Gross 
Advances) 
Market Risk 
(Inter-bank borrowings/ 
Total borrowings) 
Asset Risk 
(Loan loss provisions/ 
Total assets) 
Concentration 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CR5 (Loans & 
Advances) 
0.204*    
(0.123) 
 0.522*** 
(0.103) 
 1.440*** 
(0.465) 
 
HHI 
 
 0.147      
(0.245) 
 0.072      
(0.291) 
 3.578*** 
(0.824) 
Control 
Variables 
      
Size -0.083*** 
(0.014) 
-0.081*** 
(0.014) 
-0.131*** 
(0.012) 
-0.121*** 
(0.017) 
-0.628*** 
(0.051) 
-0.566*** 
(0.050) 
ROA -0.006    
(0.007) 
-0.005    
(0.007) 
-0.005    
(0.007) 
-0.002    
(0.008) 
0.636*** 
(0.025) 
0.633*** 
(0.025) 
GDP Growth -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006   
(0.004) 
-0.001    
(0.004) 
-0.012    
(0.013) 
0.000      
(0.012) 
Intercept 0.588      
(0.106) 
0.667      
(0.961) 
0.778      
(0.098) 
1.009      
(0.116) 
3.058      
(0.358) 
3.048      
(0.328) 
FE/RE RE RE RE FE FE FE 
R-square 
(within) 
0.069 0.066 0.092 0.087 0.669 0.673 
F-stat    15.29*** 322.30*** 329.19*** 
Wald Test 59.90*** 57.32*** 174.43***    
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Concentration and Risk (Capital Risk, Liquidity Risk) 
 Capital Buffer 
(Equity/ Total assets) 
Liquidity Buffer 
(Liquid assets/ Total assets) 
Concentration 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CR5 (Loans & 
Advances) 
12.518*** 
(2.807) 
 -1.034 
(4.141) 
 
HHI 
 
 26.397*** 
(4.976) 
 9.249      
(7.379) 
Control 
Variables 
    
Size -3.977*** 
(0.311) 
-3.485*** 
(0.306) 
-4.205*** 
(0.458) 
-4.147*** 
(0.454) 
ROA 3.275*** 
(0.153) 
3.266*** 
(0.152) 
3.190*** 
(0.226) 
3.148*** 
(0.226) 
GDP Growth -0.128 
(0.080) 
-0.012 
(0.074) 
0.190*     
(0.118) 
0.174      
(0.110) 
Intercept 17.575 
(2.162) 
18.321 
(1.981) 
25.293    
(3.190) 
23.186    
(2.938) 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE 
R-square 
(within) 
0.627 0.632 0.429 0.431 
F-stat 269.00*** 274.38*** 120.19*** 120.85*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 8: Competition and Risk (All Five Types of Risk) 
 Default Risk 
(Gross NPAs/ 
Gross 
Advances) 
Market Risk 
(Inter-bank 
borrowings/ 
Total 
borrowings) 
Asset Risk 
(Loan loss 
provisions/ 
Total assets) 
Capital 
Buffer 
(Equity/ 
Total assets) 
Liquidity 
Buffer 
(Liquid 
assets/ Total 
assets) 
Competition 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
H Stat -0.023 
(0.033) 
0.060*    
(0.035) 
0.008      
(0.106) 
-0.188 
(0.650) 
0.661      
(0.944) 
Control 
Variables 
     
Size -0.085*** 
(0.014) 
-0.133*** 
(0.013) 
-0.596*** 
(0.053) 
-3.744*** 
(0.327) 
-4.121*** 
(0.475) 
ROA -0.005    
(0.007) 
-0.003   
(0.008) 
0.646*** 
(0.025) 
3.363*** 
(0.154) 
3.185*** 
(0.224) 
GDP Growth -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.000      
(0.004) 
0.002      
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.076) 
0.176      
(0.110) 
Intercept 0.721      
(0.094) 
1.033      
(0.084) 
3.675      
(0.336) 
23.323 
(2.076) 
23.866    
(2.973) 
FE/RE RE RE FE FE FE 
R-square 
(within) 
0.066 0.091 0.664 0.616 0.430 
F Stat   315.18*** 256.11*** 120.38*** 
Wald Test 57.50*** 136.28***    
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Robustness check for Default Risk, Market Risk, Asset Risk 
 Default Risk 
(Gross NPAs/ Gross 
Advances) 
Market Risk 
(Inter-bank borrowings/ 
Total borrowings) 
Asset Risk 
(Loan loss provisions/ 
Total assets) 
Concentra
tion 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CR5 
(Deposits) 
0.193*    
(0.111) 
 0.483*** 
(0.091) 
 1.902*** 
(0.430) 
 
CR5 
(Assets) 
 0.066      
(0.109) 
 0.526*** 
(0.091) 
 1.651*** 
(0.397) 
       
Control 
Variables 
      
Size -0.087*** 
(0.014) 
-0.081*** 
(0.014) 
-0.138*** 
(0.012) 
-0.122*** 
(0.012) 
-0.689*** 
(0.054) 
-0.591*** 
(0.050) 
ROA -0.006    
(0.007) 
-0.005    
(0.007) 
-0.005     
(0.007) 
-0.006    
(0.007) 
0.627*** 
(0.025) 
0.633*** 
(0.025) 
GDP 
Growth 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005    
(0.004) 
-0.006    
(0.004) 
-0.013    
(0.012) 
-0.012   
(0.012) 
Intercept 0.612      
(0.097) 
0.650      
(0.111) 
0.829      
(0.091) 
0.714      
(0.101) 
3.127     
(0.319) 
2.691      
(0.379) 
FE/RE RE RE RE RE FE FE 
R-square 
(within) 
0.070 0.066 0.094 0.096 0.674 0.672 
F-stat  57.35***   329.73*** 328.03*** 
Wald Test 60.20***  177.64*** 185.95***   
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Robustness check for Capital Risk, Liquidity Risk 
 Capital Buffer 
(Equity/ Total assets) 
Liquidity Buffer 
(Liquid assets/ Total assets) 
Concentration 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CR5 (Deposits) 14.954***  
(2.587) 
 4.574 
(3.853) 
 
CR5 (Assets)  11.495*** 
(2.404) 
 6.658* 
(3.546) 
     
Control 
Variables 
    
Size -4.436*** 
(0.327) 
-3.666*** 
(0.304) 
-4.448*** 
(0.487) 
-4.200*** 
(0.449) 
ROA 3.212*** 
(0.153) 
3.275*** 
(0.153) 
3.136*** 
(0.227) 
3.131*** 
(0.225) 
GDP Growth -0.126** 
(0.077) 
-0.103 
(0.077) 
0.140      
(0.115) 
0.118      
(0.115) 
Intercept 18.635 
(1.921) 
16.108 
(2.294) 
23.492    
(2.860) 
20.823    
(3.383) 
FE/RE FE FE FE FE 
R-square 
(within) 
0.635 0.629 0.430 0.432 
F-stat 277.80*** 270.94*** 120.78*** 121.71*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
